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1. This report examines the economic competitiveness of a cohort of regions in the Middle East. It explores the fact that 
whilst many Middle Eastern regions may owe some of their competitiveness to the natural advantages of oil reserves, for 
others their competitiveness has been achieved through other means.
2. Recent issues relating to volatility in the global price of oil once again draw attention to the potential issue of resource-
dependence negatively impacting on effort to improve regional competitiveness, i.e. the so-called resource curse 
hypothesis.
3. The competitiveness of regions generally refers to the presence of conditions that both enable firms to compete in their 
chosen markets and for the value these firms generate to be captured within a particular region.
4. In the context of this report, therefore, regional competitiveness is defined as the difference in the rate of economic 
development across regions and the capacity and capability of regions to achieve future economic growth relative to other 
regions at a similar stage of economic development.
5. In order to gain insights into the specifics of regional competitiveness and growth trajectories within these continental 
blocs and nations, it is necessary to unpack the resources underpinning global rates of regional economic development. 
The tool used here to achieve this is the World Competitiveness Index of Regions (WCIR).
6. Overall, it is found that the average level of regional competitiveness in the Middle East is relatively low, with a WCIR score 
of 39.1 (global mean average = 100).
7. The most competitive ‘region’ included in the Middle Eastern analysis is Israel, followed by the oil-rich small states of Qatar 
and Kuwait. These regions are the only ones to achieve a level of competitiveness above the WCIR sample average of 100. 
Many of the other relatively competitive regions are those found in central and eastern Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, each of which has high levels of oil reserves.
8. Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, the fourth most competitive Middle Eastern region, is one of the regions that 
has most strongly embraced the sovereign wealth fund approach to economic development. The Emirate of Dubai also 
appears in the top 10 Middle Eastern regions, and is fast positioning itself as a significant financial centre.
9. The majority of the least competitive regions are located in the two largest Middle Eastern nations included in the sample: 
Saudi Arabia (five regions) and Turkey (three regions). The least competitive Saudi Arabian regions are located in the north 
(Northern Borders, Al-Jouf, Tabouk) or south (Jazan and Najran) away from the main oil producing areas of the nation.
10. In general, the most competitive regions in the Middle East are those that have developed beyond their traditional reliance 
on natural resource exploitation, and diversified their economies toward high-technology manufacturing or advanced 
service-based sectors.
11. Those regions within the Middle East that are the least competitive tend to be the more peripheral regions, which lack 
natural resource wealth and do not possess a large urban agglomeration. In some cases these regions are reliant on the 
better resourced regions for their level of welfare, particularly through the subsidized supply of goods.
12. In general, the policies pursued by Middle Eastern regions to encourage economic development have not necessarily 
followed the approaches utilized by other regions at the same stage of development.
13. Some oil-rich Middle Eastern regions are attempting to leap-frog industrialization in order to develop knowledge-based 
economies that could be described in Western terms as post-industrial. Attempts to foster more diversified knowledge-
based economies have been the focus of these policies.
14. It is recommended that the focus of future competitiveness policies and strategies in the Middle East should encompass: 
making finance available to firms to expand R&D and other knowledge-based activities; improving the physical infrastructure 
allowing companies to locate in better equipped premises; and creating better networks between businesses, universities 
and other innovation-performing organisations.
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This report explores the extent to which Middle Eastern regions have generated relatively high or low levels of competitiveness. 
Whilst many Middle Eastern regions may owe some of their competitiveness to the natural advantages of oil reserves, for 
others their competitiveness has been achieved through other means. Their small size and high degree of autonomy means 
that many of the regions are effectively independent states. Middle Eastern nations and their regions have been character-
ized by some as ‘rentier states’ (Brach, 2009), whereby a rent-seeking culture characterized by traits such as a large welfare 
deadweight loss, a perception of the market as rewarding the rich and well-connected, and a focus on rent capture rather 
than innovation (Krueger, 1974), is likely to hold back regional competitiveness. As Rodrik et al. (2004) find, institutions are 
often more important than geography and trade integration for economic development, and it is quite conceivable that the 
unique political economy of Middle Eastern regions will have profound effects on both their overall competitiveness and also 
the sources of this competitiveness.
Many Middle Eastern regions have advantages associated with natural resources. However, whilst this can boost the output 
and outcome competitiveness, through artificially high labour productivity and employment, these same resources may hold 
back the development of other components of competitiveness (Leamer, 1999; Auty, 2007). Indeed, recent issues relating to 
volatility in the global price of oil once again draw attention to the potential issue of resource-dependence negatively impact-
ing on effort to improve regional competitiveness, i.e. the so-called resource curse hypothesis (Stevens, 2003). A number of 
Middle Eastern regions are within nations that fit with Beblawi and Luciani’s (1987) definition of the rentier state, whereby a 
considerable proportion of government income is linked to the exploitation of natural resource wealth rather than tax receipts. 
This reduces obligations to tax payers and the constraints they face when determining where to spend income (Anderson, 
1987). Furthermore, Middle Eastern regions have traditionally been constrained by their climate (Brach, 2009) and human 
capital resources (Ewers, 2013).
Historically, Middle Eastern regions have formed parts of larger empires, as well as being treated as colonies by Western pow-
ers in the early- and mid-twentieth century, with independence only being acquired relatively recently (Owen, 2004). This may 
have directly limited their economic development and opportunities to increase their level of competitiveness. Indirectly, the 
governance structures developed after independence are to a large degree also influenced by the previous Western powers 
(Louis, 1984; Owen, 2004), which again may have limited development. Although neo-classical growth theories such as the 
Solow (1957) model assume that output is a function of capital and labour, studies have found that only a small proportion 
(roughly one third) of the difference in growth rates between East Asian nations and those in other regions, such as Latin 
America, can be explained by differences in labour and capital accumulation (World Bank, 1993). The implication is that it is 
not just the extent to which investments are made, but also the means by which they are made (Auty, 2007). Linked to this, 
studies such as Bisat et al. (1997) and Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoundakis (2007) have found that investments in physical 
and human capital have not been matched by improvements in total factor productivity within the Middle East. This has often 
seen such resource-rich economies fall behind their counterparts (Auty, 2001).
The remainder of the report is structured as follows: section 2 briefly introduces the notion of regional competitiveness and its 
measurement. Sections 3 and 4 focus on examining competitiveness across a cohort of Middle Eastern regions; whilst section 
5 reviews the formulation and design of policies to address competitiveness challenges. Section 6 concludes the report and 
reflects on the priorities as Middle Eastern economies continue to move forward.
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The competitiveness of regions generally refers to the presence of conditions that both enable firms to compete in their cho-
sen markets and for the value these firms generate to be captured within a particular region (Begg, 1999; Huggins, 2003). 
Regional competitiveness, therefore, is considered to consist of the capability of a particular region to attract and maintain 
firms with stable or rising market shares in an activity, while maintaining stable or increasing standards of living for those who 
participate in it (Storper, 1997). Given this, competitiveness may vary across geographic space, as regions develop at different 
rates depending on the drivers of growth (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004).
While the competitiveness of regions is intrinsically bound to their economic performance, there exists a growing consensus 
that competitiveness is best measured in terms of the assets of the regional business environment (Malecki, 2004, 2007). 
These include the level of human capital, the degree of innovative capacity, and the quality of the local infrastructure – all of 
which affect the propensity to achieve competitive advantage in leading-edge and growing sectors of activity.  The influence 
these assets and other externalities can have on firm competitiveness, such as the ability of regions to attract creative and 
innovative people or provide high-quality cultural facilities, are all important features of regional competitive advantage (Kitson 
et al., 2004). In other words, competitiveness is increasingly concerned with creativity, knowledge, and environmental condi-
tions, rather than being purely based on accumulated wealth (Huggins, 2003). Mahroum and Al-Saleh (2013) introduce the 
notion of ‘demand-led related diversification’ (DLRD), which stipulates that successful economic diversification and industrial 
renewal strategies have higher chances of success if (i) they are based on existing or anticipated market demand, either do-
mestically or globally, (ii) that they can be - at least partially - supplied by existing domestic capabilities; and that (iii) they aim 
to develop complementary capabilities that are - at least partially - compatible with an existing domestic ones.
Regional competitiveness models are usually implicitly constructed in the lineage of endogenous growth frameworks, whereby 
deliberate investments in factors such as human capital and knowledge are considered to be key drivers of growth differen-
tials. In the context of this report, therefore, regional competitiveness is defined as the difference in the rate of economic 
development across regions and the capacity and capability of regions to achieve future economic growth relative to other 
regions at a similar stage of economic development.
In order to gain insights into the specifics of regional competitiveness and growth trajectories within these continental blocs 
and nations, it is necessary to unpack the distribution of endogenous and knowledge-based resources underpinning global 
rates of regional economic development. The tool used here to achieve this is the World Competitiveness Index of Regions 
(WCIR). The concept of regional competitiveness has evolved beyond those studies and measures that previously regarded it 
as simply consisting of the ability to compete with other regions for export markets, often relying on labour productivity alone 
as a measure of competitiveness differentials. It is now recognized that whilst regions compete, the main competition between 
regions is not only in terms of attracting and nurturing highly productive firms (Tewdwr-Jones and Phelps, 2000), but also the 
productive knowledge stemming from the attraction and nurturing of the creative knowledge-based workers and entrepre-
neurs who underpin the innovative capacity of regional firms (Rohr-Zänker, 2001; Florida, 2002a; Mellander et al., 2011). This 
competition occurs through the provision of sufficiently high returns on capital, attractive wages and employment prospects 
(Krugman, 2003).
The WCIR provides a tool for analysing the development of a range of regional economies across the globe. It enables an il-
lustration of the changing patterns of regional competitiveness on the international stage to be generated. The methodology 
employed by the WCIR attempts to integrate the key influences on changes in contemporary rates of economic development 
identified by the relevant literature. In fundamental terms, the WCIR aims to produce an integrated and overall benchmark 
of the knowledge capacity, capability, and sustainability of each region, and the extent to which this knowledge is translated 
into economic value and transferred into the wealth of the citizens of each region. In other words, the WCIR is explicitly tied 
to the theoretical discourse stemming from endogenous growth theory, with knowledge and human capital at the centre of 
its analysis. The WCIR analysis covers 546 regions. In the Middle East, 35 regions covering Israel, Qatar, and Kuwait (each as 
region-states), as well as 13 Saudi Arabian, 7 United Arab Emirates, and 12 Turkish regions are benchmarked.
The WCIR represents an integrated and overall benchmark of the knowledge capacity, capability, and sustainability of each re-
gion, and the extent to which this knowledge is translated into economic value and transferred into the wealth of the citizens of 
each region. Therefore, the WCIR is explicitly tied to the theoretical discourse stemming from endogenous growth theory, with 
knowledge and human capital at the centre of its analysis. In order to empirically analyse competitiveness at a regional level, 
the framework presented by Figure 1 is adopted, introducing a means for measuring feedbacks via the long-term sustainability 
of knowledge, and thus competitiveness. Within this model, regional competitiveness inputs are distinguished according to 
whether or not they can be best considered as 5th-wave or 4th-wave knowledge capital. Fifth wave knowledge capital inputs 
concern the acknowledged role played by the digital revolution and the Internet as the enabling innovation underpinning 
twenty-first century economic growth (Hall and Preston, 1988; Wymbs, 2004; Devezas et al., 2005; Linstone and Devezas, 
2012). Fourth-wave knowledge capital is related to the prior dominance played by innovation and technological developments 
stemming from investment in R&D, principally in manufacturing activities (Hall and Preston, 1988). Full methodological details 
can be found in the appendix.
2: Regional Competitiveness  
9The Middle East Competitiveness Report: Regional and Territorial Analysis
Figure 1: Framework Underpinning the World Competitiveness Index of Regions (WCIR)
2: Regional Competitiveness  
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Outcomes
Outputs Knowledge Sustainability
Inputs:
4th Wave Knowledge Capital
5th Wave Knowledge Capital
Knowledge Sustainability
3: Regional Competitiveness in the Middle East
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Globally, the leading region on the WCIR holds no great surprise, consisting of San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara region of the 
United States, which is commonly referred to as Silicon Valley. As has been very well documented, this region has a long his-
tory of innovation and engagement in the knowledge economy. Its origins stem from the 1940s with Stanford University’s 
world leading research and government investment in defence research playing a key role (Sölvell, 2008). In comparison, the 
average level of regional competitiveness in the Middle East is relatively low, with a WCIR score of 39.1 and a median ranking 
of 411th (Table 1). In terms of those Middle Eastern regions that are the most competitive, they clearly possess a range of 
differing economic characteristics (Table 2).
Table 1: Summary statistics of Middle Eastern regions’ competitiveness
A number are small oil-rich states such as Kuwait and Qatar, while others are regions of larger countries that include the 
capital city or other large agglomerations, such as Al-Riyadh and Istanbul. The most competitive region included in the Middle 
Eastern analysis is Israel (WCIR score 168.8, ranked 111th). This is, perhaps, of little surprise as Israel has long had trade 
ties to Europe and North America (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Munin, 2010). An absence of natural resources has ensured 
that Israel has achieved competitiveness through different routes to many of the Middle Eastern regions. In particular, it 
has established a considerable presence in high-technology-based sectors (Rosenberg, 2010), and Almor (2011) provides 
examples of how small high-technology firms within Israel have continued to prosper following the economic downturn of 
2008, largely due to their flexibility, innovative nature and export orientation. Breznitz (2013) also notes the success of small 
innovative firms within Israel, although doubt is cast on the sustainability of clusters based purely on the innovation phase 
of the production cycle. It is suggested that for continued regional growth access to firms across the different stages of 
production will be required (Breznitz, 2013).
3: Regional Competitiveness in the Middle East
WCIR score WCIR rank
Average 39.1 388
Median 31.7 411
Maximum 168.8 111
Minimum -21.8 523
Range 190.6 412
Skewness 1.8 -1.2
Kurtosis 4.1 1.5
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Middle 
East Rank Region Nation WCIR score WCIR rank
1 Israel Israel 168.75 111
2 Qatar Qatar 142.33 181
3 Kuwait Kuwait 114.95 244
4 Abu Dhabi UAE 66.44 320
5 Al-Riyadh Saudi Arabia 65.43 327
6 Eastern Region Saudi Arabia 58.95 335
7 Istanbul Turkey 55.48 347
8 Al-Qaseem Saudi Arabia 55.40 349
9 East Marmara Turkey 52.22 358
10 Dubai UAE 50.40 363
Table 2: Ten most competitive Middle Eastern regions
Alongside Israel are the oil-rich small states of Qatar (WCIR score 142.3, ranked 181st) and Kuwait (WCIR score 115.0, ranked 
244th). These regions are the only ones to achieve a level of competitiveness above the WCIR sample average of 100. Many 
of the other 5 relatively competitive regions are those found in central and eastern Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
each of which has high levels of oil reserves. The difficulty faced by these regions is the extent to which they can maintain 
or further develop their competitiveness in a manner that is not so fully reliant on these reserves (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2004; Simmons, 2005; Brach, 2009; Alshumaimri et al., 2010).
Auty (2007) outlines three key factors that may help ensure that natural resource wealth is used in a manner that is 
sustainable and will ultimately increase competitiveness. First, the establishment of an offshore capital fund set up to capture 
the rent associated with natural resources and reduce the potential for rent seeking behaviour. Second, the use of rents from 
natural resource wealth to be made in an open and transparent manner, as a means of limiting rent seeking; and third, the 
establishment of an organization with responsibility for assessing the most effective alternative uses of capital funds. Abu 
Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, the fourth most competitive Middle Eastern region (WCIR score 66.4, ranked 320th), is 
one of the regions that has most strongly embraced the sovereign wealth fund approach. Its most important capital fund, the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, was initiated in 1976 and is estimated to have US$627 billion of assets under management 
(Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2012). However, as noted above, it is important that these capital funds are not only present, 
but also well designed and transparent, otherwise there is a danger of a lack of public spending control (Davis et al., 2001), 
resulting in further rent seeking occurring (Auty, 2007).
The Emirate of Dubai also appears in the top 10 Middle Eastern regions (WCIR score 50.4, ranked 363rd), and although it 
is below the average for the whole WCIR sample, it is fast positioning itself as a significant financial centre (Cheung, 2010). 
However, the danger of investment in domestic infrastructure in Dubai is that it is often capital intensive and provides less 
benefit for the population as a whole. As such, Dubai’s overseas investments may be just as important and a more efficient 
use of resources until the economy has further developed its competitiveness (Auty, 1990).
As is the case for many larger nations, there is variation in the competitiveness across Middle Eastern regions, with there being 
an identifiable core and periphery (Krugman, 1991, 2011). In the same way that many of the most competitive regions owe 
their competitiveness to the ‘luck’ of considerable natural resources or agglomeration, the least competitive regions are those 
that nature has not favoured in the same manner. In the case of Turkey, Istanbul has a population in excess of 13 million and 
enjoys considerable agglomeration effects, with the adjacent region of East Marmara further benefiting from spillover effects. 
In general, studies have found a split between the more successful west and less successful east of Turkey (Ersoy and Taylor, 
2012).
3: Regional Competitiveness in the Middle East
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3: Regional Competitiveness in the Middle East
Table 3 indicates that the majority of the least competitive regions are located in the two largest Middle Eastern nations 
included in the sample: Saudi Arabia (five regions) and Turkey (three regions). The least competitive Saudi Arabian regions are 
located in the north (Northern Borders, Al-Jouf, Tabouk) or south (Jazan and Najran) away from the main oil producing areas 
of the nation. The lagging regions of Turkey are the less densely populated regions in the east of the country. The differing 
governance mechanisms and institutions of the Middle Eastern states are visible here. For instance, although the Saudi regions 
differ greatly in terms of their access to natural resources, there are not the same disparities in competitiveness present as 
there are between the regions of the US, for example, or some of the European and BRIC nations, particularly Russia and 
China. In the case of Saudi Arabia, whilst a more centralized managed economy may not allow leading regions to achieve the 
level of competitiveness that could be reached with freer markets, this approach does potentially provide more freedom to 
redistribute resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009), which may prevent the development of large disparities between regions.
Table 3: Ten least competitive regions
In terms of achieving the maximum level of national welfare, such an approach may have benefits (Brun et al., 2002). However, 
it may also have long-term consequences, particularly where a high-rent approach is taken and governments move away from 
wealth creation to rent redistribution. A further outcome of this approach is that it may not lead to increased industrialization, 
which would absorb labour and reduce poverty, but an economy within which the civil service becomes over-expanded (Auty, 
2007). This leads to a bureaucratic regional economy within which physical (Auty and Kiiski, 2001), human (Birdsall et al., 
2001), and social capital (Woolcock et al., 2001) are accumulated more slowly. Unfortunately, such a system is largely self-
sustaining (Acemoglu et al., 2011), and there have been calls for greater autonomy to be given to provinces, which reflects 
growing dissatisfaction with corruption and the mismanagement of regional development projects (Al-Rasheed, 2013). This 
helps to explain the relatively low average competitiveness of the Middle Eastern regions identified in Table 1, even with the 
advantages many enjoy. In the case of economies such as Turkey, the weaker regions in the east of the nation have suffered 
further difficulties in the form of terrorist activities that have hindered investment and limited competitiveness (Öcal and 
Yildirim, 2010; Derin-Gure, 2011).
Brach (2009) uses the Heritage Foundation’s ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ (Miller et al., 2013) as a proxy for economic 
institutions in order to link such institutions and economic development. No equivalent measure is available at the regional 
level, but Table 4 reports the national Index of Economic Freedom measures for the relevant nations in 2013. There seems 
to be evidence to suggest that a number of the Middle Eastern regions are developing stronger economic institutions, and it 
might be expected that, along with the other developments discussed above, this will lead to competitiveness improvements in 
future years. Qatar and the regions of the United Arab Emirates appear to be best positioned to move beyond their dependence 
on natural resource wealth (Cevik, 2011). In the case of Kuwait, although it is one of the most competitive Middle Eastern 
regions, it may struggle to utilize its mineral wealth in an efficient manner to maintain or increase its competitiveness. In the 
case of Turkish regions, they are less likely to be influenced by the resource curse, but weak economic institutions may also 
hinder their ability to improve their competitiveness in future years.
Middle 
East Rank
Region Nation WCIR score WCIR rank
26 Najran Saudi Arabia 19.98 457
27 Ras Al - Khaimah UAE 18.21 463
28 Tabouk Saudi Arabia 18.16 464
29 Fujairah UAE 17.60 466
30 Middle East Anatolia Turkey 10.88 478
31 Southeast Anatolia Turkey 10.34 480
32 Northeast Anatolia Turkey 6.39 485
33 Al-Jouf Saudi Arabia 6.25 486
34 Jazan Saudi Arabia -17.86 518
35 Northern Borders Saudi Arabia -21.84 523
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Table 4: Economic Freedom Index
Source: Miller et al. (2013)
World Rank (N=177) 2013 Score
Qatar 27 71.3
United Arab Emirates 28 71.1
Israel 51 66.9
Kuwait 66 63.1
Turkey 69 62.9
Saudi Arabia 82 60.6
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4: Examining the Components of Competitiveness
In general, the most competitive regions in the Middle East are those that have developed beyond their traditional reliance 
on natural resource exploitation, and diversified their economies toward high-technology manufacturing or advanced service-
based sectors. Those regions within the Middle East that are the least competitive tend to be the more peripheral regions, 
which lack natural resource wealth and do not possess a large urban agglomeration. In some cases these regions are reliant 
on the better resourced regions for their level of welfare, particularly through the subsidized supply of goods (Silva et al., 2013).
Table 5 divides regions into those with above or below median Middle Eastern regional competitiveness in order to examine 
in more detail the nature of competitiveness differences. Overall, it is clear that both the relatively more competitive (WCIR 
score 64.5) and less competitive (WCIR score 15.1) regions in the Middle East display levels of competitiveness below the 
average for the WCIR sample and, as the analysis in the preceding section showed, these figures to some extent hide the 
overall variation in competitiveness levels, with Israel, Qatar and Kuwait displaying much higher levels of competitiveness than 
the majority of the remaining regions.
Table 5: Absolute contributions to competitiveness by WCIR components in more and less competitive Middle Eastern regions
The one component that differs little between the most and least competitive Middle Eastern regions is that of knowledge 
sustainability. For both sets of regions the mean average of this component is well below the average for the overall sample 
of regions. In fact, successful Middle Eastern regions, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, are highly 
reliant on foreign labour for the continued development of their industries (Toledo, 2011). This is consistent with studies that 
have found much of the growth in the Middle East to be associated with physical capital accumulation, rather than human 
capital (Abu- Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2007).
As such, knowledge absorption from foreign companies has been relatively low (UNDP, 2003), and there seems to be little 
evidence that the relevant infrastructure and investment is being made in the knowledge sustainability component of 
development. In the case of education, however, it should be noted that whilst investment may be significant as a whole, it is 
not always distributed effectively (World Bank, 2007). Ibourk and Amaghouss (2012) suggest that less affluent nations often 
display high levels of education inequality, so that benefits from increased investment in education are largely received by a 
relatively rich minority of the population. There are also suggestions that universities are not providing graduates with the skills 
required by the private sector (Achoui, 2009).
The most competitive regions clearly have higher levels of 4th- and 5th-wave knowledge capital, although crucially this 
component remains below the global average. This suggests that whilst attempts have been made by a number of regions 
to diversify their economies, these efforts have not been wholly successful. For a number of these resource-rich economies, 
the inability to reduce their dependence on their staple product may again be associated with the potential for rent-seeking 
activities. Olson (1982) outlines how those associated with mineral extraction will potentially limit the adoption of new 
innovations and technologies through political pressure to protect their own positions. In contrast to a number of the BRIC 
regions, which have been able to adopt and adapt foreign technologies to establish considerable stocks of 4th- and 5th-wave 
knowledge capital, efforts in most Middle Eastern regions have been less apparent.
 One fundamental explanation for this lack of knowledge-upgrading lies with the weak private sector found in these economies. 
The private sector of many of the Middle Eastern regions is dependent on state patronage rather than entrepreneurship, with it 
being poorly connected to the global economy, which limits its ability to adopt new technologies and exploit economies of scale 
(Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Indeed, in some Middle Eastern nations changes in productivity rates are found to be negatively 
associated with economic growth (Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2007). The exception to this is Israel, which is found to enjoy 
increases in total factor productivity (TFP) resulting from investments in new technology. In comparison, much of the economic 
growth experienced in Turkey is attributable to investments in physical capital, with a negative contribution from productivity 
growth, and a small contribution from improvements in human capital. This is not to say that economic development in nations 
such as China is entirely due to increases in productivity, as increases in physical and human capital also dominate for most 
East Asian nations, but efficiency improvements from technological advancements are also present (Krugman, 1994b), and 
may play a more important role for nations achieving higher levels of development (Collins and Bosworth, 1996).
5th-wave 
knowledge 
capital
4th-wave 
knowledge 
capital
Outputs/ 
Outcomes
Knowledge 
Sustainability
WCIR
More Competitive -0.30 -0.32 0.14 -0.49 64.5
Less Competitive -0.53 -0.68 -0.55 -0.54 15.1
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4: Examining the Components of Competitiveness
Where new industries have been established, evidence of their success is not universal. For instance, Ersoy and Taylor (2012) 
suggest that there may be a negative relationship between the presence of knowledge workers and growth in Turkey. However, 
the dependent variable in their analysis is change in the unemployment rate, which means there is a danger of reverse 
causality. The success and higher remuneration in such industries may attract labour to the region, which the knowledge 
industries are unable to absorb, at least in the short term. Consistent with this, there has been a marked migration from 
regions in the east to those in the west of the country in recent years (Kırdar and Saracoğlu, 2008; Yildirim et al., 2009).
Attempts to rectify the deficiencies in both 4th-wave knowledge capital and knowledge sustainability are notable in some 
economies, such as Saudi Arabia’s investment in infrastructure and the development of global knowledge links for its 
universities; for example, the establishment of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in the Saudi Arabian 
region of Makkah Al- Mokarramah (Fischer, 2008).
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5: Regional Competitiveness and Development Policies in the Middle East
Changing patterns of economic activity and their consequential impacts on rates of development have brought competitiveness 
to the top of many political and policymaking agendas. Ensuring that regional competitiveness is retained and enhanced is 
a common concern across the globe, although the nature of these concerns may differ according to their past histories and 
future expectations. With regard to Middle Eastern regions, their economies have long been aware that whilst their reserves of 
oil and gas have been plentiful, they are also finite. This means that governments and regional policymakers need to ensure 
that the rents from natural resources are invested in the creation of alternative capital, whether it is produced physical capital 
and infrastructure or human capital, in order to ensure that the overall assets of a region are not depleted (Auty, 2007). 
Interestingly, the World Bank (2005) have developed an Adjusted Net Savings indicator, which adjusts national savings for the 
depletion of mineral resources, with the results suggesting that not all countries have taken a sustainable approach to the use 
of their wealth (Auty, 2007).
One approach adopted by Middle Eastern national governments has been to invest their oil wealth in businesses and 
infrastructure within other economies (Winder, 2010). An alternative approach adopted by some regions, particularly those 
with lower oil and gas reserves, has been to try to diversify their economies and utilize their wealth to fund a rapid increase in 
knowledge resources (Herb, 2009). However, access to technology must also be accompanied by the capability to effectively 
adapt and adopt such technology (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Los and Timmer, 2005).
In general, the policies pursued by Middle Eastern regions to encourage economic development have not necessarily followed 
the approaches utilized by other regions at the same stage of development. With the exceptions of regions within Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and Israel, it could be argued that Middle Eastern regions are attempting to leap-frog industrialization in order to 
develop knowledge-based economies that could be described in Western terms as post-industrial (Ewers and Malecki, 2010). 
Some of the policies being utilized in Middle Eastern regions have taken a ‘if you build it, they will come’ approach, such as 
the development from scratch of Jubail in the northeast of Saudi Arabia (Clary and Karlin, 2011). This is a tricky proposition 
since the competitiveness of a knowledge-based service sector is often built upon the demand for professional services by key 
parts of the manufacturing sector (Guerrieri and Meliciani, 2005). This becomes self-sustaining once a competitive position 
is reached, as the service sector itself also becomes one of the main customers for services. Reaching this point, however, 
without an existing manufacturing sector may be harder. Many of Middle Eastern regions have the rent from oil production 
to finance investments, but choosing the most effective and appropriate investments to make is the bigger problem (Auty, 
2007). In order to address this, policy efforts are being made to enhance lagging knowledge sustainability and 4th- and 5th-
wave knowledge capital. However, the traditional approach of paying for the population to study abroad has not been entirely 
successful, with funding not always linked to studying courses that are appropriate for the type of knowledge-based services 
economy that Middle Eastern regions are seeking (Looney, 1994).
Acknowledging the unsustainable nature of economies based on the exploitation of natural resources, Al-Riyadh in SaudiArabia 
is one of a number of regions to invest heavily in educational and research infrastructure, such as the King Saud University 
(Onsman, 2011). The first Saudi Arabian mixed-gender higher-education institution, the King Abdullah University of Science 
and Technology (KAUST), was also recently established in Makkah Al-Mokarramah (Clary and Karlin, 2011). Alongside the high 
investment in domestic educational resources, the Saudi Arabian authorities have also attempted to accelerate the process 
through policies such as the King Abdullah Foreign Scholarship Program, which funds its population to study in Western 
universities. The programme’s scale is apparent in the fact that Saudi Arabia has the highest proportion of its population 
across all nations studying internationally (Clary and Karlin, 2011).
Other regions in the Middle East have followed a slightly different path, with one approach being to encourage Western 
universities to establish campuses and ‘knowledge cities’ through the use of subsidies, such as the Education City in Qatar 
or International Academic City in Dubai (Krieger, 2008). However, these investments have little direct input from their parent 
universities, so that effectively just a brand is being sold (Lewin, 2008). This may explain why attempts to increase the education 
of the indigenous population of many regions, as a means of improving participation rates in the growing knowledge intensive 
sectors, have not been entirely successful, with managers in the United Arab Emirates often being reluctant to recruit from the 
national population due to a distrust of indigenous capabilities and work-readiness (Al-Ali, 2007).
In an attempt to mirror the success of university science park regions, such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) and the Research 
Triangle Park (Link and Scott, 2003; Weddle et al., 2006) in the US region of Durham-Chapel Hill, the Riyadh Techno Valley Park 
has been developed at King Saud University (Alshumaimri et al., 2010). The science park aims to boost the skills and abilities 
of university staff and students as knowledge workers, as well as enabling greater knowledge and technology transfer with 
private sector businesses. The park is intended to focus primarily on those sectors perceived to have the greatest potential 
for boosting productivity in industries related to chemical technology and materials; biological, agriculture and environmental 
technologies; and information and communication technologies. In many ways, Saudi Arabia is leading the way with such 
investments, with the majority of universities in Middle Eastern regions continuing to function primarily as education and 
training institutions, with little emphasis on research activity (Weir, 2007).
5: Regional Competitiveness and Development Policies in the Middle East
Attempts to foster more diversified knowledge-based economies have been the focus of policies in Abu Dhabi (Mahroum 
& Saleh, 2013), with the objective being to provide sustainable employment for the region’s population (Davidson, 2009). 
Encouraging young workers to take jobs in the private sector is difficult, with the alternative of highly paid and relatively low-
effort public-sector jobs stemming from a culture of entitlement (Leamer, 1999). As noted above, managers of private firms 
are wary of the engagement of local individuals, and in order to integrate United Arab Emirate nationals into the private-sector 
workforce policies requiring quotas have been utilized (Al-Ali, 2007). However, the lack of motivation means that even when 
employed there are still difficulties of fostering the indigenous workforce to achieve higher levels of productive effort (Marcel, 
2006). Ewers and Malecki (2010) suggest that there is a need to promote greater interaction between local regional firms 
and foreign affiliates to boost knowledge transfer. Indeed, even the most competitive Middle Eastern regions, such as Dubai, 
are failing to provide appropriate mechanisms to boost interactions between universities, foreign firms and domestic firms 
(Ferretti and Parmentola, 2007).
Ross (2008) suggests that ensuring there is a clear agreement as to how mineral wealth will be utilized and distributed 
is important and, where possible, should be established before extraction occurs, in order to avoid potential conflict. This 
provides a difficult conundrum in relation to the design of sovereign wealth funds. Auty (2007) highlights the need for funds to 
be transparent, with the investment decision-making processes being required to consider all available options, both domestic 
and international. However, whilst rules on the proportion of rent absorbed by a capital fund, and the categories on which it 
is spent, reduces the potential for political interference, it can also prevent adjustment when revenues change over time and 
previous spending plans are no longer appropriate. Davis et al. (2001) question the viability of sovereign wealth funds, given 
the ability of governments to circumnavigate the fiscal discipline that such funds are intended to impose.
Where funds have a stabilization function they are intended to prevent overspending in periods of high oil revenues and 
expensive borrowing in periods of falling oil revenues. Stabilization can be undermined where funds are earmarked for certain 
types of off-budget spending, which may have long term ramifications where recurring expenditure will appear in future budgets. 
Whilst the saving function of funds is intended to ensure that oil revenues are available for future generations, the problem is 
that a government can always borrow to finance flows into the fund, resulting in no additional saving actually occurring.
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This report has analysed the competitiveness of a range of regions across Middle Eastern economies. It has shown that whilst 
there are a small number of globally competitive regions, most still have some way to go before they move into the higher 
competitiveness echelons. Despite much investment in regions in economies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, these regions still perform below the global average. However, it is still early days in terms of these regions reaping 
the competitiveness rewards of such investments, and time will tell whether or not these investments achieve their apparent 
promise. Furthermore, it is clear that the complexities of the political economies of the nations within which these regions are 
located, especially the role of sovereign wealth funds, adds a significant dimension in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the link between investment and competitiveness. It will, therefore, be interesting to monitor changes in Middle Eastern 
regional competitiveness in comparison with both the more western and eastern politico-economic regimes in coming years.
Within the global economic competitiveness stakes, the future challenge is to sustain its rapid progress. At the global level, 
success in these stakes equates to a marathon race, requiring consistent and enduring effort. As the recent economic crisis 
has shown, with often severe clarity, no nation can afford to rest on its laurels. Perhaps the biggest competitiveness challenge, 
and opportunity, for the UAE is to create further synergies between the revenues created by oil and the emerging innovation-
driven sectors of the economy as a means of increasing the size of the domestic private sector market.
At the end of the day, it is individual entrepreneurs, and the business ventures they create, that facilitate the growth of 
both domestic and international markets, and there is a continuing need for close collaboration between government and 
educational institutions to design programmes to encourage a growing proportion of students to start business ventures, 
rather than seeking employment within often highly saturated public sectors. This would help boost competitiveness outcomes 
across economic activities, encourage the movement away from cheap foreign labour and large-scale enterprise in favour of 
promoting home-grown business, and provide a means of nurturing entrepreneurs with sound ideas and visions for creating 
high value-added businesses.
Other key factors requiring on-going attention include the development of the research base and the creation and transfer of 
this research between universities, local businesses, and other research establishments, as well as the further development 
of workforce skills, the telecommunications infrastructure, and key business sectors. With regard to improving levels of R&D 
investment, there may be little option other than government attempting to stimulate private sector investment by either 
increasing its own R&D expenditure. In order to produce a positive R&D multiplier effect, it is vital that government creates 
networks with the private sector to enable the effective transfer of knowledge from government-funded R&D projects to firms. 
Such policies are already in place in many nations, with increased public sector investment most usually being routed through 
the higher education sector.
In summary, the focus of future competitiveness policies and strategies should encompass: making finance available to firms 
to expand R&D and other knowledge-based activities; improving the physical infrastructure allowing companies to locate in 
better equipped premises; and creating better networks between businesses, universities and other innovation-performing 
organisations. Implementation of these strategies will also need to account for differences in the conditions and context 
across the Middle East, and may often be best addressed by authorities representing particular emirates. Although the UAE 
is a relatively small nation in population terms, it is rapidly growing. This growth is rather geographically uneven across the 
state, indicating the need for competitiveness policies specifically tailored to the needs of particular emirates and the cities 
and regions within them.
Finally, the role of strong leadership to champion the development of a competitive economy should not be overlooked. Such 
leadership has clearly been a key source of the improved competitiveness of many Middle Eastern regions in recent years, and 
will remain of crucial importance in the future. Importantly, strong leadership is required to ensure that the evolution towards 
a national economic culture that embraces competitiveness is achieved without compromising the wider values and beliefs 
of the national society.
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Overall, the WCIR framework employs a set of 19 indicators. In the input domain of new knowledge production, we choose 
the number of employees in five high-tech sectors as proxies for the human capital devoted to innovation. The five groups are: 
IT and computer manufacturing; high-tech services; biotechnology and chemicals; instrumentation and electrical machinery; 
and automotive and mechanical engineering. Other technology-input measures include R&D expenditures performed by the 
business and government sectors. Compared with corporate R&D, the impact of public sector R&D is less direct in its route in 
terms of both diffusion and timing. Nonetheless, there is evidence that spillovers from public sector R&D raise an economy’s 
productivity (Jaffe, 1989a; Adams, 1990). Another technology measure used is the number of patents granted. The propensity 
to patent is known to vary widely across industries, with many patents turning out to be worthless, while a few are extremely 
valuable (Pavitt, 1982; Griliches, 1990). However, there is some evidence that suggests a close association between patents 
and other productivity-based measures at the national and regional level (Fagerberg, 1996; Acs et al., 2002).
Private equity investment capital is used as a proxy of the availability of funds for knowledge-based, start-up firms. Private 
equity funding is often concentrated in small or medium-sized firms, including venture capital and start-up investments, which 
tend to be in knowledge-based activities. For indicators of the long-term competitiveness sustainability, public expenditures 
on primary and secondary education and higher education are included. There is a sequential interaction between a region’s 
education and training system and its stock of high-skilled workers. The rate of enrolment in education is influenced by a 
region’s employment and career prospects, as well as the socioeconomic background of pupils and the quality of schooling. 
Enrolment, in turn, determines the region’s workforce skills, productivity and economic performance (Bradley and Taylor, 
1996). Public investment in education plays an important role in this sequential cycle, particularly improving the quality of 
local schooling over time.
In addition, three indicators of internet-based infrastructure are employed: numbers of internet hosts, secure servers, and 
broadband access – as measures of knowledge competitiveness sustainability. Other measures included are the regional 
unemployment rate and economic activity rate (defined by the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population). Also 
included is the proportion of workers employed in a managerial capacity, which is used as a proxy of human capital. Although 
this is hardly a perfect indicator of human capital, a similar indicator is used in international studies of the labour market 
(OECD, 1994). The wages of managers are generally higher than those of other occupations, reflecting the greater amount 
of investment made in education and training. Lastly, we adopt labour productivity and mean gross monthly earnings as 
indicators of competitiveness outputs and outcomes, respectively.
To remove effects of the size of each region analysed, per capita figures are taken for the following variables: R&D expenditures 
performed by the business sector and government sector; patents granted; private equity investment capital; internet hosts; 
secure servers; broadband access; and public expenditures on primary and secondary education, and higher education. 
Employment in the five high- or medium-high-tech industries and the number of managers are based on a per total regional 
employment basis. To avoid individual indicators having an excessive influence on the four components of the WCIR or the 
composite WCIR index, the individual indicators are standardized after appropriate scaling.
Organising the Indicators
Below the rationale underlying the grouping for each of the indicators is presented.
Fifth-wave knowledge capital inputs
As already argued, knowledge economies compete on value and innovation, rather than costs alone. As regions make the 
transition to knowledge economies, we would expect increases in the number and proportion of knowledge- based businesses 
and employment. In particular, 5th-wave knowledge-capital-based sectors have a higher potential for innovation and 
competitive advantage. Due to their intense requirements for innovation, these sectors have a higher propensity for developing 
a knowledge-driven economy, with the outputs from these sectors being more likely to generate knowledge spillovers for the 
rest of the regional economy. High venture capital/private equity activity is also essential to the translation of new ideas into 
innovation, as without the necessary availability of finance, a region’s investments in R&D and human capital would yield little 
return. As such, the 5th-wave knowledge capital indicators are:
• employment in IT and computer manufacturing per 1,000 employees
• employment in biotechnology and chemicals per 1,000 employees
• employment in high-technology services per 1,000 employees
• per capita private equity investment.
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Fourth-wave knowledge capital inputs
Investment and employment in research and development activities signal the strength of efforts to develop and exploit new 
technology in order to enlarge the knowledge base. Similarly, the number of patents indicates how successful a region is in 
converting knowledge into potentially commercially valuable products and processes. Also, more traditional manufacturing 
knowledge-based sectors are a good measure of knowledge employment concentration. High activity rates and managerial 
density are also considered to be strong indicators of the potency of the human capital stock in a region. As such, the 4th-wave 
knowledge capital indicators are:
• employment in automotive and mechanical engineering per 1,000 employees
• employment in instrumentation and electrical machinery per 1,000 employees
• economic activity rate
• number of managers per 1,000 employees
• per capita expenditures on R&D performed by government
• per capita expenditures on R&D performed by business
• number of patents registered per one million inhabitants.
Outputs/outcomes
Economic ‘performance’ indicators are clearly vital components of competitiveness, and are usually the most established and 
well-known measures used. Those indicators considered here portray a specific image of a region: how productive its economy 
is, and the living standards enjoyed by its citizens. To this end, the WCIR analyses the following indicators:
• labour productivity
• mean gross monthly earnings
• unemployment rates.
Knowledge sustainability
Future knowledge capital is embodied within those individuals currently undertaking education. Although strong regions will 
be able to attract talent from elsewhere, in the long-term, reinvestment of returns into local human capital through education 
will help ensure that a region’s knowledge economy maintains a sufficient flow of human capital. Likewise, local investment in 
ICT infrastructure is also fast becoming a necessity in order to transfer knowledge effectively and efficiently. Based on these 
factors, the following indicators of knowledge sustainability are included:
• per capita public expenditures on primary and secondary education
• per capita public expenditures on higher education
• secure servers per one million inhabitants
• internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants
• broadband access per 1,000 inhabitants.
WCIR composite indicator
In order to establish the composite WCIR measure each of the four components are first calculated as an average of its sub-
listed indicators (with the exception of the Knowledge Sustainability, where first an average of the three ICT infrastructure 
variables is taken, and then with the remaining two indicators another average is calculated). A mean average of the value of 
the components is taken to give a raw WCIR score. In order to calculate the final index, the raw scores are first transformed so 
that their average becomes 100. Then a geometric mean of the variances of the converted variables is taken, which is termed 
(variance)original. Finally, the scores for all regions are standardized, multiplied by the square root of (variance)original.
Middle Eastern Regions Benchmarked
Israel; Kuwait; Qatar; Al-Baha, Saudi Arabia; Al-Jouf, Saudi Arabia; Al-Madinah Al-Monawarah, Saudi; Arabia; Al-Qaseem, Saudi 
Arabia; Al-Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Aseer, Saudi Arabia; Eastern Region, Saudi Arabia; Hail, Saudi Arabia; Jazan, Saudi Arabia; 
Makkah Al-Mokarramah, Saudi; Arabia; Najran, Saudi Arabia; Northern Borders, Saudi Arabia; Tabouk, Saudi Arabia; Aegean, 
Turkey; Central Anatolia, Turkey; East Black Sea, Turkey; East Marmara, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey; Meditterranean, Turkey; 
Middle East Anatolia, Turkey; Northeast Anatolia, Turkey; Southeast Anatolia, Turkey; West Anatolia, Turkey; West Black Sea, 
Turkey; West Marmara, Turkey; Abu Dhabi, UAE; Ajman, UAE; Dubai, UAE; Fujairah, UAE; Ras Al – Khaimah, UAE; Sharjah, UAE; 
Umm Al – Quwain, UAE
Appendix: Design of the World Competitiveness Index of Regions (WCIR)
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